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FIDELITY, BASIC LIBERTIES, AND THE SPECTER OF
LOCHNER
JAMES E. FLEMING"
INTRODUCTION

I want to begin by frankly acknowledging that the group of
scholars participating in the conference is more conservative
than the crowd with whom I usually travel. Accordingly, at the
outset, I want to say something ingratiating. Then, I will say
something provocative. Here is the ingratiating part: economic
liberties and property rights, like personal liberties, are fundamental rights secured by our Constitution. In fact, economic
liberties and property rights are so fundamental in our constitutional scheme, and so sacred in our constitutional culture, that
there is neither need nor good argument for aggressive judicial
protection of them. Rather, such liberties are understood properly as "judicially underenforced norms," to use Lawrence G.
Sager's term.' As Cass Sunstein would put it, their fuller enforcement and protection is secure with legislatures and executives in "the Constitution outside the Courts."2
Here is the provocative part: Recently, I was invited to participate in a Constitutional Commentary symposium entitled

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics, Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. Ph.D.
1988, Princeton University; J.D. 1985, Harvard University; A.B. 1977, University of
Missouri. I am grateful to Linda McClain for helpful comments on a draft of this
Article, to Sot Barber, Martin Flaherty, Abner Greene, Steve Macedo, Frank
Michelman, Larry Sager, Bill Treanor, and Ben Zipursky for instructive conversations concerning its arguments, and to Adam Wolfson for valuable research assistance. I prepared the Article for the conference on "Fidelity, Economic Liberty, and
1937," held at William and Mary School of Law on February 27, 1999, and benefitted from presenting a draft on that occasion.
1. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norm, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure]; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410, 419 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Thinness].
2. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSITMTION 9-10 (1993).
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"Constitutional Chaos: The Joys and Hazards of Stomping Legal
Butterflies." The symposium invited contributors to choose any
single development in American constitutional history-such as
an amendment, an episode at the Constitutional Convention, a
case, or even a Supreme Court appointment-and to extinguish
it utterly from legal memory. I declined the invitation. If I had
accepted it, however, I would have written about Justice Scalia's
and Chief Justice Rehnquist's sham conservative methodologies
for interpreting the Due Process Clause, focusing on Michael H.
v. Gerald D.' and Washington v. Glucksberg.' In prior work, I
criticized Scalia's Michael H. methodology, arguing that we
should chart a middle course between Scalia-the rock of liberty
as "hidebound" historical practices-and Charybdis-the whirlpool of liberty as unbounded license.s In a symposium on "Constitutional Tragedies," I argued that it was a constitutional tragedy for the Supreme Court to hold in Glucksberg that the Constitution does not protect the right to die, includinf the right of
terminally ill persons to physician-assisted suicide.
Elsewhere, I also have defended a conception of the due process inquiry that has affinities to, although it differs from, Justice Harlan's formulation in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,7 the
conception of the joint opinion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,8
and Justice Souter's formulation in his concurrence in
Glucksberg.9 This Article criticizes Rehnquist's formulation of
the due process inquiry in Glucksberg-as requiring a "careful
description" of the asserted right-showing that he uses a "whipsaw" between specific and abstract levels of generality to rig the
description in order to make it easy for the Court to reject the
right.10
3. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
4. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
5. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L.
REv. 211, 271-73 (1993) [hereinafter Fleming, Constructing]; James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 56-64 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming,
Securing].
6. See James E. Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy in Dying: Or Whose Tragedy Is
It, Anyway?, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 162, 162-68
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
7. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8. 505 U.S. 833, 841 (1992) (joint opinion) (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
9. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 60-97.
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True to its title-Fidelity,Basic Liberties, and the Specter of
Lochner-this Article focuses on three points. The first relates to
fidelity in constitutional interpretation, bringing the best conception of fidelity-integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution-to bear in interpreting the Due Process Clauses. The second relates to basic liberties, conceding that economic liberties
and property rights are fundamental in our constitutional
scheme, but arguing that they are properly judicially
underenforced. The third relates to the specter of Lochner v.
New York," arguing that on the best understanding of what was
wrong with Lochner-status quo neutrality-aggressive judicial
protection of economic liberties would involve illegitimate
"Lochnering," but that aggressive judicial protection of personal
liberties does not. This Article merely will sketch the lines of argument that I plan to pursue in further work. Before outlining
these points, I shall take up Lochner, 1937, and the flights from
substance in constitutional theory.
A specter is haunting constitutional theory-the specter of
Lochner.'a In the Lochner Era, the Supreme Court gave heightened judicial protection to substantive economic liberties
through the Due Process Clauses.' 4 In 1937, during the constitutional revolution wrought by the New Deal, West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish" officially repudiated the Lochner Era, marking the
first death of substantive due process.e Nevertheless, the ghost
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. In this section, I draw upon my analysis in Fleming, Constructing, supra note
5, at 211-14.
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987)
(characterizing Lochner as an infamous "defining case" in constitutional law, and a
"spectre" that "has loomed over most important constitutional decisions"); cf KARL
MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), reprinted
in THE MAREX-ENGELS READER 469, 473 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) ("A
spectre is haunting Europe-the spectre of Communism.").
14. See, e.g., Adkins V. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a federal minimum wage law for women and minors as violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61 (invalidating, under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state maximum hours law that
the Court described as "mere meddlesome interference[] with the rights of the individual" to liberty of contract).
15. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law and signaling the
demise of the Lochner Era by overruling Adkins).
16. For accounts of the official demise of Lochner, see, for example, LAURENCE H.
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of Lochner has perturbed constitutional theory ever since, manifesting itself in charges that judges are "Lochnering" by imposing their own substantive fundamental values in the guise of
interpreting the Constitution."'
The cries of Lochnering have been most unrelenting with
respect to Roe v. Wade,'" which held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a realm of substantive personal liberty or privacy broad enough to encompass
the right of women to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy." In a well-known critique, The Wages of Crying Wolf A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, John Hart Ely attacked the Court for
engaging in Lochnering, arguing that to avoid doing so it must
confine itself to perfecting the processes of representative democracy,20 as intimated in Justice Stone's famous footnote four of
United States v. CaroleneProducts Co. 21
Despite these cries, Casey officially reaffirmed the "central
holding" of Roe instead of marking the second death of substan-

tive due process by overruling it. 22 In an apoplectic dissent,

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-6 to -7 (2d ed. 1988); Robert G.
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 36-38; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 873-83. For attempts to resurrect stringent judicial protection of economic liberties, see, for example, RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980). There is a considerable body of revisionist literature concerning the Lochner
Era. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999).
17. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION

OF THE LAW 42-49, 99, 224-25 (1990); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying WolfA Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 944 (1973) (coining the term "Lochnering" or "to Lochner").
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. See id. at 164.
20. See Ely, supra note 17, at 933-45.
21. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (joint opinion)
(O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). Justices Stevens and Blackmun, who would have
reaffirmed Roe in its entirety, joined Parts I, II, m, V-A, V-C, and VI of the joint
opinion, supplying the fourth and fifth votes necessary to make those parts the opinion of the Court, thus reaffirming Roe. See id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The remaining four Justices would have overruled Roe. See id. at
944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by White,
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Scalia blasted the Court for continuing to engage in Lochnering,
protesting that the Court must limit itself to giving effect to the
original understanding of the Constitution, narrowly conceived.23
Ely's and Scalia's critiques illustrate the two responses to the
specter of Lochner that have dominated constitutional theory
since West Coast Hotel Co. Both strategies have been widely
criticized for taking "pointless flights from substance": the flights
to process and original understanding, respectively.' The substance from which these dominant responses are said to flee is
not only substantive liberties like privacy or autonomy, but also
substantive political theory in interpreting the Constitution.
These flights are said to be pointless because perfecting processes and enforcing original understanding inevitably require the
very sort of substantive constitutional choices that these strategies are at pains to avoid.
After Casey, the long-anticipated second death of substantive
due process is unlikely to come anytime soon-unless it came in
Washington v. Glucksberg.2 5 But Glucksberg is probably less
analogous to West Coast Hotel Co. than to San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.26 Instead of overruling imporScalia, & Thomas, JJ.); id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, JJ.). Prior to the decision in
Casey, some scholars believed that the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), was evidence of "the second death of substantive due process." E.g.,
Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215
(1987).
23. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, J.J.) (analogizing Roe and
Casey to Lochner and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)); see
also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (defending an originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (same).
24. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470 (1981)
(arguing that the flights from substance to process and original understanding "end
in failure" because "[jiudges cannot decide what the pertinent intention of the Framers was, or which political process is really fair or democratic, unless they make
substantive political decisions of just the sort the proponents of intention or process
think judges should not make"); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (arguing that
Ely's theory takes a pointless flight from making substantive constitutional choices
to perfecting processes).
25. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
26. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Rodriguez curbed the expansion of both the fundamental
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tant precedents, Glucksberg seems to say "this far and no further," while also attempting to gut the precedents of any vitality
or generative force. Here, I should praise the brochure concerning this conference for accepting that substantive liberties are
here to stay-and indeed the participants in the conference
appear to accept that premise-rather than reopening the controversy whether substantive liberties as such are anomalous
and illegitimate in our constitutional scheme.
What is needed is a theory of constructing the substantive
Constitution that would beware of the specter of Lochner, yet
also resist the "temptations" to flee from substance to process or
original understanding. 27 In other works, I have outlined such a
theory, in the form of a Constitution-perfecting theory, which
reinforces not only the procedural liberties but also the substantive liberties embodied in our Constitution.28 This theory constructs the substantive Constitution by securing the preconditions for self-government in our constitutional democracy in two
rights and the suspect classification branches of equal protection analysis, proclaiming that "[ilt is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." Id. at 33. Just as
Rodriguez takes a "this far and no further" approach to "substantive equal protection," so Glucksberg takes such an approach to substantive due process.
27. In Casey, the joint opinion resisted the temptations, in interpreting the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to take a flight from substantive
liberties to procedural liberties or to original understanding. See Casey, 505 U.S. at
846-48 (acknowledging that it was "tempting" to abdicate the responsibility of exercising reasoned judgment). The joint opinion discussed the infamous era of Lochner.
See id. at 861-62. It reiterated, however, that the Due Process Clause protects substantive liberties, "a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."
Id. at 847. Justice Scalia replied angrily that the Court's "temptation" is not to
abdicate responsibility but rather "in the quite opposite and more natural directiontowards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it succumbs." Id.
at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., White & Thomas, JJ.). For similar notions of "temptation" and "seduction," see
BORK, supra note 17, passim; Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for the Soul of the
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at A19.
28. I mean "perfecting" in the sense of interpreting the Constitution with integrity
so as to render it a coherent whole, not in Henry Monaghan's caricatured sense of
"Our Perfect Constitution" as a perfect liberal utopia or an "ideal object" of political
morality. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,
356 (1981); cf Frank I. Michelman, Constancy to an Ideal Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
406, 407 (1981) (distinguishing "weak-sense perfectionism" or "constitutional rationalism" from "strong-sense perfectionism"). For the notion of law as integrity, see RONALD DwORIN, LAW's EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
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senses: not only deliberative democracy, whereby citizens apply
their capacity for a conception of justice to deliberate about the
justice of basic institutions and social policies, as well as about
the common good, but also deliberative autonomy, whereby citizens apply their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberate about and decide how to live their own lives.2 9
I. FIDELITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

A. Competing Conceptions of Fidelity and Interpretationof the
Due Process Clause
The topic of this conference, "Fidelity, Economic Liberty, and
1937," raises the question of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. In 1996, Fordham University School of Law held a symposium on "Fidelity in Constitutional Theory."3 1 In that symposium, I argued that the question of fidelity raises two fundamental questions: "Fidelity to what?" and "What is fidelity?"" The
short answer to the first-fidelity to the Constitution-poses a
further question: what is the Constitution? For example, does
the Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or
enact relatively concrete historical rules and practices? Does the
Constitution presuppose a political theory of majoritarian democracy or one of constitutional democracy? The short answer to
the second-being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting
it-leads to another question: how should the Constitution be
interpreted?" Does. faithfulness to the Fourteenth Amendment
require recourse to political theory to elaborate general moral
concepts, or prohibit it and instead require historical research to
discover relatively specific original understanding? And does the
29. For development of this theory, see generally Fleming, Constructing, supra
note 5; Fleming, Securing, supra note 5; James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In
Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Tx. L. REv. 509 (1997) (book review).
30. See Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247
(1997).
31. In this section, I draw from my analysis in James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our
Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335 (1997).
32. These questions of What and How, along with the question of "Who is to interpret?" are the basic interrogatives of constitutional interpretation. See WALTER F.
MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING & SoTIRos A. BARBER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 112-18 (2d ed. 1995).

154

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:147

quest for fidelity in interpreting the Constitution exhort us to
make it the best it can be, or forbid us to do so in favor of enforcing an imperfect Constitution?33
Thus, the question, "What is the best conception of fidelity in
constitutional interpretation?," ultimately poses the questions,
"What is the Constitution and how should it be interpreted?"
The question of fidelity is not a narrower question about how to
follow the original meaning of the text or how to interpret the
Constitution so as to fit the historical materials surrounding its
framing and ratification. Those narrower questions grow out of
particular originalist answers to the question of fidelity. They
are not the question of fidelity itself. I fear that the brochure
announcing our conference, in its formulation of the topic, may
beg the question of fidelity in precisely this way.'
Ronald Dworkin has long recognized that these fundamental
questions of what and how are the central questions of fidelity.
From his first book, Taking Rights Seriously," to his recent
book, Freedom's Law," he has argued that commitment to interpretive fidelity requires that we recognize that the Constitution
embodies abstract moral principles rather than laying down
particular historical conceptions, and that interpreting and applying those principles require fresh judgments of political theory about how they are best understood.3 ' He now calls this interpretive strategy the "moral reading" of the Constitution." Yet,
narrow originalists such as Robert H. Bork and Justice Antonin
Scalia have asserted a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation, claiming that fidelity requires following
the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the relatively specific
original understanding of, the framers and ratifiers of the Con-

33. See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 356.
34. Several of the articles in the conference also beg the question of fidelity in
this way. See Bernstein, supra note 16; John 0. McGinnis, The Inevitable Infidelities
of Constitutional Translation: The Case of the New Deal, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
177 (1999); Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter
and the Mistranslationof the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3 (1999).
35. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
36. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996).
37. See id. at 1-38, 72-83; DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 131-49.
38. See DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 1-38.
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stitution.39 They have charged that constitutional theorists who
reject these claims are "revisionists" who disregard fidelity,
thereby subverting the Constitution. Dworkin has vigorously
and cogently punctured the narrow originalists' pretensions to a
monopoly on fidelity, arguing that commitment to fidelity entails
the pursuit of integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution, and that the narrow originalists are the real "revisionists." 40
More generally, the Fordham Symposium implicitly challenged the narrow originalists' claim to a monopoly on fidelity,
for it featured several competing conceptions of fidelity:
1Dworkin's understanding of fidelity as pursuing integrity with
the moral reading of the Constitution;4 ' Bruce Ackerman's understanding of fidelity as synthesis of constitutional moments;'
Lawrence Lessig's understanding of fidelity as translation across
generations;' and Jack Rakove's understanding of fidelity as
keeping faith with the founders' vision." The Fordham Symposium illustrated two strategies for responding to the claim of the
narrow originalists. Dworkin took the first: turn the tables on
the narrow originalists. He argued that fidelity entails the very
approach that they are at pains to insist it forbids, and prohibits

39. See generally BORK, supra note 17; SCALIA, supra note 23; Scalia, supra note
23.
40. See DWoRmN, supra note 36, at 74-76; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION
125-29 (1993). I take the term "integrity" from Dworkin's conception of "law as integrity." DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 176-275. For an insightful analysis of Dworkin's
general conception of legal reasoning in relation to fidelity, see Gregory C. Keating,
Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (1993).
41. See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997).
42. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991);
Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519 (1997).
43. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv.
1365 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Constraint]; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity]; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding].
44. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLTICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSITUION (1996); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History
(Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587 (1997).
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the very approach that they imperiously maintain it mandates.s
The second was taken by Ackerman and Lessig, to say nothing of Lessig's sometime co-author, Cass Sunstein: beat the
narrow originalists at their own game. 46 Ackerman, Lessig, and
Sunstein advance fidelity as synthesis and fidelity as translation
as "broad" or "soft" forms of originalism that are superior, as
conceptions of originalism, to narrow originalism. What is
"broad" or "soft" about their forms of originalism is that these
theorists conceive original understanding at a considerably higher level of abstraction than do the narrow originalists.'
In my essay in the Fordham Symposium, as well as in other
works, I have argued that the best conception of fidelity is
Dworkin's understanding of fidelity as pursuing integrity with
the moral reading of the Constitution. I will not repeat those
arguments here. I also have brought that conception of fidelity
to bear in interpreting the Due Process Clause. 9 I have argued
that the Constitution in general, and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular, embody abstract moral principles of liberty
and equality rather than enacting relatively specific historical
rules and practices.50 Put another way, the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a scheme of "aspirational principles" rather than
merely being the Burkean deposit of "historical practices."5 '
I realize that such an approach arouses fears about the need
to cabin or tether liberty, privacy, or autonomy in constitutional
45. See DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 132-33, 144-47.
46. See ACKERMAN, supra note 42; Ackerman, supra note 42; Lessig, Constraint,
supra note 43; Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 43; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Lessig, Understanding, supra note 43; see also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITI-

CAL CONFLICT 171-82 (1996) (proposing a "soft" form of originalism). For other works
illustrating the emergence of a form of broad originalism, see generally MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS (1994); Martin S.
Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLmm. L. REV.
523 (1995); William Michael Treanor, The
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM.
47. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 46,
Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 325-48

Original Understanding of the Takings
L. REV. 782 (1995).
at 171-82; Bruce Ackerman, Liberating
(1992).

48. See Fleming, supra note 31; James E. Fleming, Original Meaning Without
Originalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1997).

49. Here I summarize, and draw upon, Fleming, Securing, supra note 5.
50. See id. at 56-64.
51. See id.; infra text accompanying note 64.
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law. I have proposed to tether the right of autonomy by grounding it within a constitutional constructivism, a guiding framework for constitutional theory with two fundamental themes:
deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy.52 I have advanced deliberative autonomy as a unifying theme that shows
the coherence and structure of certain substantive liberties on a
list of familiar "unenumerated" fundamental rights, commonly
classed under privacy, autonomy, or substantive due process."
The bedrock structure of deliberative autonomy secures basic
liberties that are significant preconditions for persons' ability to
deliberate about and make certain fundamental decisions affecting their destiny, identity, or way of life. As against critics'
charges that the right of privacy or autonomy is dangerously
unruly and unconstrained, I argued that it is rooted, along with
deliberative democracy, in the language and design of our Constitution." Each theme, I contended, has a structural role to
play in securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for our
scheme of deliberative self-governance.
Finally, I argued for reconceiving the substantive due process
inquiry in terms of a criterion of the significance of an asserted
liberty for deliberative autonomy, charting a middle course between Scalia-the rock of liberty as "hidebound" historical practices-and Charybdis-the whirlpool of liberty as unbounded
license." I acknowledged that my view has affinities to (although it differs from) Justice Harlan's idea, expressed in his
dissent in Poe, of a "rational continuum" of ordered liberty, and
thus to the Casey joint opinion's idea of "reasoned judgment."" I
also was deeply critical of Scalia's approach to interpreting the
Due Process Clause in his plurality opinion in Michael H. and
his concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health."
Recently, in his concurrence in Glucksberg, Justice Souter
made a bid to be the Justice Harlan of our time." I want to
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Fleming, Securing, supra note 5, at 17-24.
See id. at 3, 7-14.
See id. at 36-48.
See id. at 56-64.
Id. at 59-63.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756 n.4, 763-73 (1997) (Souter,
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applaud Souter's conception of the due process inquiry, despite
his erroneous application of it in Glucksberg in concluding that
the Constitution does not protect a right to die that includes the
right of terminally ill persons to physician-assisted suicide.59 I
want to criticize Rehnquist's formulation of the due process
inquiry in the majority opinion in Glucksberg. The next section
argues that if Harlan's methodology represents a "rational continuum" of liberty, Rehnquist's methodology represents a "whipsaw" of liberty between specific and abstract levels of generality
in the characterization of asserted rights. The same argument
applies to Scalia's methodology in Michael H. and Cruzan.
B. Rehnquist's and Scalia's Methodologies for Interpreting the
Due Process Clause: The Whipsaw of Liberty Between Specificity
and Abstraction
In Glucksberg, Rehnquist wrote that the Court's "established
method of substantive due process analysis has two primary features:" 0
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition," . . . and "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed"... . Second, we have required ... a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking" that direct and restrain our exposition of the
Due Process Clause.6 '
Rehnquist continued: "Justice Souter, relying on Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in [Poe,] would largely, abandon this

J., concurring) (defending and building upon Justice Harlan's conception of due process). In his paper for this conference, Alan Meese criticizes Justice Souter's formulation of the due process inquiry and his analysis of economic liberty. See Meese,
supra note 34.
59. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 770-89 (Souter, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 720.
61. Id. at 720-21.
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restrained methodology. . . . True, the Court relied on Justice
Harlan's dissent in Casey, but ... we did not in so doing jettison
our established approach."
The second feature, in calling for a "careful description" of the
asserted right and an inquiry into "[olur Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices," calls to mind Scalia's formulation of
the due process inquiry in his plurality opinion in Michael H.
and in his concurring opinion in Cruzan. In Michael H., Scalia
famously offered the following methodology for selecting the
level of generality in deciding whether an asserted right has
been traditionally protected: "We refer to the most specific level
at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified."" Clearly, he conceived
tradition as "historical practices," not as "aspirational principles." "Aspirational principles" are the fundamental principles of
justice to which we as a people aspire and for which we as a
people stand, whether or not we actually have realized them in
our historical practices, common law, and statute books (collectively, "historical practices")." Our aspirational principles may
be critical of our historical practices, and they are not merely
the Burkean deposit of those practices. In Cruzan, Scalia similarly wrote: "[No 'substantive due process' claim can be maintained unless the claimant demonstrates that the State has
deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected
against state interference. "65
In Glucksberg, however, Rehnquist did not officially follow, or
even cite, Scalia's Michael H. opinion.6 6 Why not? It stands to
reason that Rehnquist did not because doing so might have
prompted O'Connor and Kennedy to concur separately with
respect to due process methodology. For one thing, O'Connor,
with Kennedy joining the opinion, concurred in. Michael H.,

62. Id. at 721, 722 n.17 (citing Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)).
63. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
64. See Fleming, Constructing,supra note 5, at 269; Fleming, Securing, supra note
5, at 57.
65. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
66. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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rejecting pointedly Scalia's "mode of historical analysis" because
it "may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this
area" and referring favorably to Harlan's dissent in Poe."' For
another, both O'Connor and Kennedy participated in the joint
opinion in Casey, which rejected Scalia'sMichael H. methodology
as "inconsistent with our law" and embraced Harlan's Poe methodology."
We should ask which methodology, that of Rehnquist or
Souter/Harlan, is more consistent with our law in the area of
substantive due process? That is, which account better fits with
and justifies cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska," Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,7 ' Griswold v. Connecticut72 Loving v. Virginia," Roe v.
Wade,74 Moore v. East Cleveland, Cruzan, and Casey? I submit
that the Souter/Harlan methodology wins hands down over
Rehnquist's methodology. The former can account for all of these
cases-as the joint opinion in Casey did through the framework
of "reasoned judgment" 7 --while the latter can account for none
of them." This should come as no surprise, for it is very likely
that, as an original matter, Rehnquist, as well as Scalia, would
have dissented in all of these cases; in fact, Rehnquist and
Scalia did dissent in some of them." Through his methodology,
Rehnquist, like Scalia, is engaging in damage control; his concerns are not merely to decline to extend this line of cases, but
also to gut the cases of any vitality or generative force.

67. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992). This is notwithstanding Rehnquist's suggestion to the contrary in Glucksberg. See supra text accompanying note 62.
70. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

71. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
72. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

73. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992).
77. Rehnquist's methodology even fails to account for Cruzan. See infra text accompanying notes 83-97.
78. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 922 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Casey, 505
U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The question arises whether Rehnquist, in applying his formulation in Glucksberg, did a Michael H. analysis. I shall proceed in two stages, looking at traditions and specificity. First, I
review traditions. At first glance, it appears that Rehnquist did
apply a Michael H. analysis. After all, he examined history, legal
traditions, and practices, which accords with Scalia's notion of
an inquiry into traditions understood as historical practices."
Indeed, Rehnquist cited many of the same sources that Scalia
drew upon in his concurrence in Cruzan.0 It is important, however, to remember that in Cruzan, Scalia drew upon those sources in arguing that there is no traditionally protected right to die,
not even the right that the Court "assumed" the Constitution
granted: the traditionally protected right of a competent person
to refuse unwanted medical treatment including life-saving hydration and nutrition." On that issue in Cruzan, Scalia's peers
evidently outvoted him eight to one."
In Glucksberg, Rehnquist drew upon these same sources in
arguing that there is no traditionally protected right to die that
includes a right to physician-assisted suicide. But he also
claimed, remarkably, that these sources support the traditionally protected right "assumed and strongly suggested" in Cruzan,"
namely, the right of a competent person to refuse unwanted
medical treatment including lifesaving hydration and nutrition-notwithstanding Scalia's own argument there that these
sources did not support such a right.s
Second, I address specificity. Again, at first sight, Rehnquist's
call for a "careful description" sounds like Scalia's call in Michael
H. for a specific or narrow, rather than abstract or broad, formulation of the asserted right. We should examine Rehnquist's

79. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-19 (1997).
80. Compare id. at 710-35, with Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 266, 293-99 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. The vote was five to four. Presumably, the four members of the five-member
majority besides Scalia assumed such a right. Clearly, all four of the dissenters supported a right to die. That makes eight, leaving Scalia as the sole Justice who rejected in principle a right to die.
83. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-35.
84. Id. at 720.
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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actual description of the right asserted in Glucksberg, however.
Here, it is useful to bear in mind Rehnquist's rather specific for-.
mulation in Cruzan of the right asserted. Instead of framing it
abstractly, as the right to die, or the right to commit suicide, he
framed it specifically, as the right of a competent adult to refuse
unwanted medical treatment including lifesaving hydration and
nutrition." Notably, in Cruzan, Scalia himself eschewed any
such specific formulation in favor of highly abstract formulations-the right to die and the right to commit suicide."
In Glucksberg, however, Rehnquist did not formulate the
asserted right specifically or narrowly, as he did in Cruzan.
Rather, he framed it highly abstractly, as "a right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.""
That is, he took the approach that Scalia took in concurrence in
Cruzan. Notably, Rehnquist did so even though several more
specific formulations were readily available to him, formulations
that arguably have greater support in our traditions, whether
they are understood as historical practices or aspirational principles. For example, Rehnquist did not frame the asserted right as
the court of appeals did in its en banc decision: the right of terminally ill, competent adults to control the manner and timing
of their deaths by using medication prescribed by their physicians." Nor did he frame it as Breyer did in concurrence: "a
right to die with dignity."90 Nor did he heed Stevens's objections
in concurrence that, even if "[h]istory and tradition provide ample support for refusing to recognize an open-ended [or 'categorical'] constitutional right to commit suicide," our Constitution
protects a "basic concept of freedom" that "embraces not merely
a person's right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted treatment, but also her interest in dignity, and in determining the
character of the memories that will survive long after her
death.""

86. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
87. See id. at 293-300 (Scalia, J., concurring).
88. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
89. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
90. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 740, 743 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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What we can see now is that both Rehnquist and Scalia resort
to a whipsaw between specificity and abstraction in formulating
the level of generality of an asserted right. Sometimes Scalia
rejects assertions of rights after framing them highly specifically, as in Michael H.: the right of "the natural father to assert
parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man, 92 or the right to have a state "award
substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child."" Other times Scalia rejects assertions
of rights after framing them in highly abstract forms, as in
Cruzan: the right to die and the right to commit suicide. This
whipsaw pinches from both sides, specificity and abstraction.
Scalia always frames the right in the manner that makes it
appear to have the least support in our traditions (understood as
historical practices).
Rehnquist's whipsaw is more complex in how it pinches from
both sides. He joined Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H.
and thus embraced Scalia's highly specific formulation." Yet, in
Cruzan, he framed the asserted right specifically, Michael H.
style, and "assumed" that it was protected,s while Scalia framed
it highly abstractly and rejected it.96 Then, in Glucksberg,
Rehnquist framed the asserted right highly abstractly and rejected it.97 To recapitulate, in doing so, (1) Rehnquist used
Scalia's own Cruzan analysis rejecting the right to commit suicide, (2) while he suggested that there is a traditionally protected right of the sort assumed in Cruzan, (3) notwithstanding
Scalia's own analysis in Cruzan arguing that there was no such
traditionally protected right. I daresay that the right "assumed
and strongly suggested" in Cruzan fails not only Scalia's test in
Cruzan, but indeed Rehnquist's test in Glucksberg.
Both Rehnquist's and Scalia's usage of this whipsaw between
specificity and abstraction shows that their search for a "careful
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989).
Id. at 127.
See id. at 113.
See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1990).
See id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-07 (1997).
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description" involves taking care to describe the asserted right in
a manner that makes it easiest for the Court to conclude that
there is no support for it in tradition and thus to reject it.
Rehnquist's and Scalia's methodologies for interpreting the Due
Process Clause are rigged against protecting basic liberties and
they are shams; they are not faithful to the abstract moral principles embodied in our Constitution of principle.
II. BASIC LIBERTIES

A. The "Double Standard" Between Economic Liberties and
PersonalLiberties
Constitutional theorists, in particular, liberal constitutional
theorists, are often said to have difficulty justifying a "double
standard" regarding economic liberties and personal liberties in
the area of substantive due process. They oppose aggressive
judicial review protecting economic liberties, for example,
Lochner, while they propose aggressive judicial review protecting
personal liberties, for example, Griswold, Roe, and Casey."
The idea of a "double standard" suggests a grid of four clear
positions available on the question of the relationship between
economic liberties and personal liberties under the Due Process
Clause. One, neither economic liberties nor personal liberties
warrant aggressive judicial protection under the Due Process
Clause, and for the same reasons: neither are enumerated in the
Constitution nor part of the original understanding of it." Two,
both economic liberties and personal liberties warrant aggressive
judicial protection, and for the same reasons: both are fundamental or integral to personhood, liberty, or autonomy.oo Three,
personal liberties, but not economic liberties, warrant aggressive
judicial protection, because the former, but not the latter, are
fundamental or integral to personhood, autonomy, or equal concern and respect.'' Four, economic liberties, but not personal
98. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 49-57

(1987).
99. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 17, at 36-49, 95-100, 110-26; SCALIA, supra note
23, at 24-25, 39; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. See, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 98, at 49-85; SIEGAN, supra note 16.
101. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 118-25, 144-46; DWORKIN, supra note 35,
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liberties, warrant aggressive judicial protection, because the
former, but not the latter, are enumerated in the Constitution
and part of the original understanding of it.10 2 To complicate the
grid somewhat, I want to suggest a fifth possibility, which I
shall defend below: Personal liberties, but not economic liberties,
warrant aggressive judicial protection, because although both
are fundamental, the latter should be judicially underenforced.0 o
B. Judicial Underenforcement of Economic Liberties and
Property Rights
My argument for judicial underenforcement of economic liberties and property rights should be situated in the context of my
larger theory regarding basic liberties. As stated above, I espouse a constitutional theory with two fundamental themes. The
first involves securing the basic liberties that are preconditions
for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their ca-

at 278; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 86 (1990); TRIBE,
supra note 16, at 1302-12.
102. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 16; Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process
by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. OT. REV. 159. Clarence Thomas
showed sympathy for this view in speeches he gave before his confirmation to the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 308-11 (analyzing Thomas's
views regarding protection of economic liberties and personal liberties, such as the
right to abortion).
103. There is also a sixth possibility, which I believe is implicit in Randy Barnett's
recent libertarian book. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUsTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998). As I interpret Barnett, he argues that both
economic liberties and personal liberties warrant aggressive judicial protection, but
for different reasons: the former because they come within the fundamental liberty
secured by the classical liberal (or libertarian) conception of justice, and the latter
because, although they do not come within that fundamental liberty (in the sense
that they are not specified in his formulation of the classical liberal conception of
justice), they incidentally relate to matters that are simply outside the jurisdiction of
government to regulate. See id. at 63-83, 214. Thus, Barnett would protect personal
liberties not in the name of securing personhood, personal liberty, or personal autonomy, but in the name of enforcing limitations on governmental authority. Indeed,
it is striking that Barnett, unlike, Macedo for example, does not seem to try to integrate economic liberties and personal liberties, or to justify them in similar terms. I
suppose that doing so might run afoul of his requirement of the parsimony of rights.
See id. at 91-94, 200 & n.3. I criticize Barnett's theory in a paper that I presented
at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. See James
E. Fleming, The Parsimony of Libertarianism (Jan. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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pacity for a conception of justice to deliberating about the justice
of basic institutions and social policies as well as about the common good. The second entails securing the basic liberties that
are preconditions for deliberative autonomy, to enable citizens to
apply their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating
about and deciding how to live their own lives. Together, these
themes afford everyone the common and guaranteed status of
free and equal citizenship in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy."' I argue for a constitutional constructivism,
by analogy to John Rawls's political constructivism, as a guiding
framework for interpreting our constitutional document and
practice. 105
Constitutional constructivism is a Constitution-perfecting theory that is an alternative to well-known process-perfecting theories such as those advanced by Ely and Sunstein.'0 6 According to
those theories, the Constitution should be interpreted as establishing a scheme of democracy, and judicial review is justified
principally in situations where the processes of democracy, and
thus the political decisions resulting from them, are undeserving
of trust. Process-perfecting theories are vulnerable to the criticism that they reject certain substantive liberties (such as privacy, autonomy, liberty of conscience, and freedom of association)
as anomalous to our scheme, except insofar as such liberties can
be recast as procedural preconditions for democracy.'07 I propose
an alternative, Constitution-perfecting theory-a theory that
would reinforce not only the procedural liberties (those related
to deliberative democracy), but also the substantive liberties
(those related to deliberative autonomy) embodied in our Constitution and presupposed by our constitutional democracy.os It is
a theory of constitutional democracy and trustworthiness. 09

104. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 5, at 218, 280-97; Fleming, Securing,
supra note 5, at 2-3, 17-23.
105. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 90-99 (1993).
106. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISmu
REVIEW 87-101 (1980); SUNSTEIN, supra note 2.

A THEORY OF JUDICiAL

107. I have developed such a criticism in Fleming, Constructing, supra note 5, at
233-35, 256-60.

108. See id. at 215; Fleming, Securing, supra note 5, at 29.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 121-38.
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Elsewhere, in developing a constitutional constructivism, I
argued that economic liberties and the right to personal property
are basic liberties, or constitutional essentials, and are preconditions for both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. 1 o But constitutional constructivism does not justify special
judicial protection of such liberties. Economic liberties and property rights are properly judicially underenforced.x' There is
every indication that they can and do fend well enough for themselves in the political process. The regulation of such liberties
does not present a situation of distrust that would warrant more
searching judicial protection. 12 Thus, despite the views of economic libertarians like Epstein, the opportunity for consenting
adults to perform capitalistic acts in private without governmental regulation is not among the stringently judicially enforced
preconditions for deliberative autonomy, any more than for deliberative democracy."1 s Much regulation that would be, as
Lochner put it, "meddlesome interferences with the rights of the
individual"114 in a libertarian, private society is legitimate, important, or even compelling in a constitutional democracy.
Thayer-style deferential scrutiny of economic regulation is appropriate,"1 s for economic liberties and property rights are secure
with legislatures and executives in "the Constitution outside the
courts." 116
110. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 5, at 289; Fleming, Securing, supra note
5, at 20, 45.
111. In recent years, nonetheless, the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Justice Scalia, has begun to apply heightened rather than deferential scrutiny to "regulatory takings" under the Just Compensation Clause (not as a matter of substantive
due process). See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
112. See Treanor, supra note 46, at 855-87; infra text accompanying notes 121-35.
But see Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 41 (1992).
113. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 3-6; Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1645-46 (1988). But see
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 163 (1974) (stating that a hypotheti-

cal "socialist society would have to forbid capitalist[icl acts between consenting
adults").
114. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
115. See generally James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (making the classic argument for judicial deference to the representative process).
116. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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It is important to distinguish between the partial, judicially
enforceable Constitution and the whole Constitution that is
binding outside the courts upon legislatures, executives, and
citizens generally in our constitutional democracy, unless and
until they amend it." Constitutional theory is broader than
theory of judicial review. We are accustomed to hearing people
wax eloquent about institutional limits on the role of courts
when they are arguing against judicial efforts to engage in social
reform."1 s We should recognize, however, that institutional limits
of courts caution against aggressive judicial enforcement of economic liberties and property rights.19 Nonetheless, those constitutional rights are binding outside the courts upon legislatures,
executives, and citizens generally.o2 0
I fear that the brochure announcing the topic for our conference does not recognize this distinction between the judicially
enforceable Constitution and the Constitution that is binding
outside the courts. Apparently, it assumes that if economic liberties are not enforced judicially, they have no protection in our
constitutional scheme! What turns on this distinction is whether protection of constitutional rights is to be conceived as confined to judicial enforcement of them or whether it also includes
enforcement by legislatures and executives. Also at stake is
whether legislatures and executives, when acting in a realm
where no judicially enforceable rights are in play, should be seen
as being bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution or
instead as being free to act in constitutionally gratuitous ways.
To say that a right is not judicially enforceable is not to say that
it concerns a matter that is constitutionally gratuitous in the
sense that legislatures, executives, and citizens generally are
free to protect it or not as they wish. A right that is not judi-

117. See id. at v-vi, 9-10, 139-40, 145-61, 350; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 586 (1975); Sager, Fair
Measure, supra note 1, at 1212-28; Sager, Thinness, supra note 1, at 414-28.
118. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991).
119. See Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 1, at 1216-20, 1219 n.22.
120. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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cially enforceable nonetheless imposes obligations upon legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to respect it or indeed to
protect it affirmatively. We need to remember that legislatures
and executives, as well as courts, have responsibilities to interpret the Constitution conscientiously and to secure our basic
liberties.
Here, I would recall 1938, not 1937, and relate my argument
to United States v. Carolene Products Co." and the preconditions for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political
processes. In the aftermath of the Court's repudiation of Lochner
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,m Carolene Products presumed that Thayer-style deferential scrutiny is appropriate in
general and, in particular, where legislation touching upon economic liberties is concerned.' But footnote four intimates three
exceptions where a more searching judicial scrutiny may be appropriate: (1) specific prohibitions of the Constitution; (2) restrictions on political processes; and (3) prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities.'
In Democracy and Distrust, Ely famously elaborated the second and third paragraphs of footnote four as presenting situations of distrust: that is, situations where we could not trust the
outcomes of the political processes to be legitimate."s The regulation of economic liberties and property rights does not present
a situation of distrust within the Carolene Products framework
that would warrant more searching judicial protection." I shall
consider briefly two arguments to the contrary: one has been
made by Epstein, and the other might be attributed to James
Madison.
Epstein has argued for bringing the "politics of distrust,""
which has operated in the scrutiny of restrictions upon and
regulations of freedom of speech, to bear upon the scrutiny of

121. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
122. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
See id.
See ELY, supra note 106, at 101-04.
See id. at 87-104; Treanor, supra note 46, at 872-75, 882-83.
Epstein, supra note 112, at 41.
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regulations of economic liberties and property rights."s In response, Frank Michelman argued cogently that there are
"functional differences between expressive liberties on the one
hand, and proprietary and economic liberties on the other, [that]
can amply explain and justify a practice of exceptionally strict
judicial scrutiny of laws directly infringing expressive liberties"
but not proprietary and economic liberties. 2 ' He argued further
that distrust of lawmakers should not be exaggerated into a
universal solvent that corrodes the legitimacy of all legislation.' As I would put it, CaroleneProducts-style distrust is not
a general libertarian distrust of government, nor does it stem
from a libertarian theory of limited government that entails
distrust of all governmental regulation.
Madison may be invoked in support of the argument that the
regulation of property rights constitutes a situation of distrust
and poses dangers of a tyranny of the majority.'' There are
three responses to this line of argument. First, in response to his
worry about a tyranny of the majority regarding property rights,
Madison did not argue for aggressive judicial protection of such
rights; instead, he argued for an extended republic as affording
the best security against a tyranny of the majority over property
rights and, for that matter, rights in general.' Second, William
Treanor has argued that the original understanding-including
Madison's understanding-supports deference to the political
processes where regulation of economic liberties and property
rights is concerned.'3 Treanor advocates judicial underenforcement of such liberties, except in situations of CaroleneProductsstyle distrust, for example, environmental racism.' Third, in
any event, Madison presumably contemplated a situation more
like class warfare, and a tyranny of the majority of nonwealthy
over the minority of wealthy. It strains credulity to think that

128. See id. at 47-59.
129. Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 91, 106 (1992).
130. See id. at 105-14.
131. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
132. See id.
133. See Treanor, supra note 46, at 836-55, 887.
134. See id. at 882-83.
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the regulation of economic liberties and property rights that we
see today in our country involves anything like class warfare.
There is arguably no country on earth where economic liberties
and property rights are more secure than in ours. The only economic phenomenon in the United States approaching class warfare is "the war against the poor,"s35 which is waged not just by
the rich but also by the middle class and indeed the working
class. In short, it is waged by the nonpoor.
I do not mean to suggest that, because the regulation of economic liberties and property rights does not present a situation
of distrust, we simply fall back upon deferential scrutiny by
default. Rather, I argue affirmatively that economic liberties and
property rights present an appropriate case for judicial
underenforcement. Granted, the regulation of personal liberties
does not represent a situation of distrust within the Carolene
Products framework that warrants more searching judicial scrutiny, at least not as it is commonly understood and as Ely has
elaborated it. as Elsewhere, however, I have argued that the
constitutional constructivism I am developing is a theory of
constitutional democracy and trustworthiness by analogy to
Ely's theory of representative democracy and distrust.s' I mean
trustworthiness in the sense of Rawls's remark: "By publicly
affirming the basic liberties citizens ... express their mutual
respect for one another as reasonable and trustworthy, as well
as their recognition of the worth all citizens attach to their way
of life." as Each of constitutional constructivism's two themes
seeks to secure a type of precondition for the trustworthiness of
political decisions in our constitutional democracy. To be trustworthy, a constitutional democracy must secure and respect a
scheme of equal basic liberties that guarantees not only the
preconditions for deliberative democracy but also the preconditions for deliberative autonomy. Ely's process-perfecting theory

135. For discussion of "the war against the poor," see RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., THE
WAR ON THE POOR: A DEFENSE MANUAL (1996); HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR
AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY POLIcY (1995);
136. See ELY, supra note 106, at 87-101; John Hart Ely, Democracy and the Right
to Be Different, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 397-400 (1981).
137. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 5, at 296-97.
138. RAWLS, supra note 105, at 319.
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secures only the former type of precondition for trust. Hence,
constitutional constructivism is a fuller theory of perfecting the
trustworthy Constitution than is Ely's theory. On this view,
judicial review securing personal liberties essential to deliberative autonomy is a precondition for the trustworthiness of political decisions in our constitutional democracy. Otherwise, citizens cannot engage in social cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect and trust. Legislative regulation of economic liberties
does not, however, undermine the preconditions for the trustworthiness of political decisions.
Admittedly, there may be some originalists who will insist-situation of distrust or not-that the original meaning of
the Due Process Clause was that both economic liberties and
personal liberties are findamental, and therefore that both
types of liberties are to be protected through judicial review
against legislative encroachment. Put another way, they may
argue basically that Justice Field was right in dissent in the
Slaughter-House Cases.' (putting aside the question of the relationship between the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
Due Process Clause). 4 0 On this view, the "whole theory of free
government" requires that we interpret the Constitution to protect all "inalienable rights" that, as Justice Bushrod Washington
put it in Corfield v. Coryell,'4 ' are "fundamental; which belong of
right to the citizens of all free governments."'42 These fundamental rights definitely include economic liberties, even though in
recent years many people have invoked this passage from
Corfield to justify protecting fundamental personal liberties.'s
My argument for judicial underenforcement of economic liberties

139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
140. See id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting). Slaughter-House for all practical purposes
reduced the Privileges or Immunities Clause to a dead letter or a cadaver. Recently,
in a case with potentially important implications, the Supreme Court anchored the
right to travel in that clause and thus at least partly revived it.-See Saenz v. Roe,
119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999). In doing so, Justice Stevens's opinion for the seven to two
majority quoted at length from Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in SlaughterHouse. See id. at 1526-27.
141. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (Washington, J., on circuit).
142. Id. at 551.
143. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 16, at 1310 n.16; Fleming, Securing, supra note '5,
at 26.
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and property rights still obtains, irrespective of historical evidence concerning original meaning. For the argument for judicial underenforcement of economic liberties acknowledges that
economic liberties, no less than personal liberties, are fundamental. It insists that this status alone does not justify more searching judicial scrutiny--especially because we should beware of
the specter of Lochner, to which the next section returns.
III. THE SPECTER OF LOCHNER

When I teach Lochner, I ask my students: "What does it mean
to charge someone with Lochnering and thus to summon the
specter or ghost of Lochner?" My response is that it means to
charge someone with doing whatever it was that the Supreme
Court did in Lochner that was so horrible. The response may
appear to be vacuous, but it is not. The point is to suggest that
Lochner functions as a rhetorical club that people use to criticize
their theoretical opponents. That is not to say that anything
goes, and that Lochnering can mean anything that anyone hurling the epithet says it means. There are better and worse arguments about what is wrong with Lochner; and, there are better
and worse arguments about the relationship between Lochner,
on the one hand, and Roe and Casey, on the other. Here, I
sketch the lines of argument concerning the specter of Lochner
that I plan to pursue in further work.
Initially, I shall catalog four understandings of Lochner, and
of the relationship between it, Roe, and Casey (this catalog corresponds to the grid of four positions stated above). One, what was
wrong with Lochner is that the Court protected "unenumerated"
substantive fundamental rights as such through the Due Process
Clause.1 " On this view, what was wrong with Lochner is also
wrong with Roe and Casey."

144. One version of this.view stems from a narrow originalism. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 17, at 44-49. Another version is rooted in a process-perfecting theory. See,
e.g., Ely, supra note 17, at 937-43.
145. Ely argued that Roe involved Lochnering on this understanding of what was
wrong with Lochner. See Ely, supra note 17, at 937-43. Ely did not argue, however,
that Casey should have overruled Roe for that reason. See JOHN HART ELY, ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 304-06 (1996).
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Two, what was wrong with Lochner is not that the Court
protected substantive fundamental rights as such through the
Due Process Clause, but that it protected the wrong substantive
fundamental rights, namely, economic liberties as distinguished
from personal liberties. 146 On this view, the Court was wrong to
protect substantive economic liberties in Lochner, but it was
right to protect substantive personal liberties in Roe and Casey.
Three, Lochner was decided rightly, and the Court should
revive aggressive judicial protection of economic liberties as well
as personal liberties through the Due Process Clause.' On this
view, Lochner, Roe, and Casey were decided rightly-all involved
judicial protection of basic liberties that are fundamental or
integral to personhood, liberty, or autonomy.
Four, Lochner was decided rightly, and the Court should revive aggressive judicial protection of economic liberties, but not
of personal liberties.' On one version of this view, Lochner
should have been decided on the basis of the Takings Clause
and/or the Contracts Clause, not the Due Process Clause. That
is, the Court should aggressively protect "enumerated" economic
liberties and property rights; but it should not aggressively protect "unenumerated" fundamental rights like personal liberties.
On this view, Lochner was decided rightly, but Roe and Casey
were decided wrongly.
I shall mention a fifth understanding of Lochner-that of
Ackerman-before concluding by considering a final account-that of Sunstein-which I believe is the best account.
Ackerman suggests that Lochner, rather than being merely the
rogue act of lunatic Justices, was at least plausible in its time, if
not rightly decided.'49 Ackerman concludes, however, that
Lochner is wrong today because the New Deal transformed the
Constitution outside the formal amending procedures of Article
V.' 0 I mention Ackerman's account here mainly because I would
be remiss if I did not do so in a conference about fidelity and
1937. Elsewhere, I have criticized Ackerman's claims that his
146. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 118-25, 144-47; DWORKIN, supra note 35,
at 278; TRIBE, supra note 101, at 84-86; TRIBE, supra note 16, at 1302-12.
147. See, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 98, at 49-85; ,SIEGAN, supra note 16.
148. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 16; Epstein, supra note 102.
149. See ACKERMAN, supra note 42, at 63-66, 101-03.
150. See id.
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theory of dualist democracy and of constitutional amendment
and transformation outside Article V is the only theory that fits
our constitutional practice and experience, focusing on his arguments that to realize "the possibility of popular sovereignty" and
"the possibility of interpretation" we must accept his theory."'1
Finally, what was wrong with Lochner has nothing to do with
protecting "unenumerated" substantive fundamental rights: it
was the Court's use of "status quo neutrality" and existing distributions as the baseline from which to distinguish unconstitutionally partisan political decisions from impartial ones."'2 On
this view, what was wrong with Lochner is unrelated to Roe and
Casey because, far from evincing status quo neutrality,'5 3 the
cases are justified on the basis of an anti-caste principle of
equality that is critical of the status quo. Indeed, Roe and Casey
are tantamount to a Brown v. Board of Education" for women. 55 Or as I would put it, they are critical of the status quo for
failing to protect personal liberties that are necessary preconditions for deliberative autonomy.' The same is true of other
leading personal liberties cases under the Due Process Clause.'
On this view, what was wrong with Lochner would be present in
any revival of aggressive judicial protection of economic liberties
and property rights through the Due Process Clause; but it is
not present in aggressive judicial protection of personal liberties
under the Due Process Clause.
CONCLUSION

I want to conclude this Article by reiterating the claim I made
at the beginning. Economic liberties and property rights are so

151. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (1998); James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American
People, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 355 (1994).
152. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 45-62, 259-61; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 87475, 882-83.
153. On this view, Lochner is alive and well, not in Roe and Casey, but in, for
example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at
84-85, 223-24; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 883-84.
154. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
155. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 259-61.
156. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 5, at 256-60, 273-75.
157. See id.
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fundamental in our constitutional scheme, and so sacred in our
constitutional culture, that there is neither need nor good argument for aggressive judicial protection of them. Such liberties
are understood properly as judicially underenforced norms.
Their fuller enforcement and protection is secure with legislatures and executives in the Constitution outside the courts.
Fidelity in constitutional interpretation does not require the
same level of judicial protection for fundamental economic liberties as for fundamental personal liberties.

